October 5, 2026

THE VOTERS ARE MOVING. THEIR PARTY REGISTRATION ISN’T.

Florida’s Republican structure remains formidable. But the voters inside that structure may be considerably more politically elastic than their registration cards imply, and that could matter for ballot questions just as much as candidates.

A quick note before we get into it.

If you’ve been receiving my Political Weather or Fiscal Weather notes, The Bigger Picture is the next iteration of that experiment.

Same instinct. Wider aperture.

Politics, public policy, taxes, business, infrastructure and civic life are usually analyzed separately. Increasingly, I’m interested in what happens when we put them beside one another.

Because that’s usually where the more interesting story is.

And this week there is a particularly good example.

HERE IS THE CONTRADICTION I CAN’T STOP THINKING ABOUT

National polling shows a substantial move away from Republicans.

Latino polling shows an even more dramatic move.

Republican candidates themselves are behaving as though the political environment has changed.

And yet Florida’s voter-registration numbers barely look like a backlash at all.

That doesn’t necessarily mean the polling is wrong.

It may mean we are looking at two different political clocks.

Voters can change their vote long before they change their identity.

And nowhere may that distinction matter more than Miami.

START WITH THE NATIONAL WEATHER

The latest New York Times/Siena polling has likely voters preferring Democratic congressional candidates 51% to 43%, with President Trump’s approval at 38%. Among independents, just 27% approve of Trump while they prefer Democratic congressional candidates 57% to 34%. Democrats also hold advantages on issues including cost of living and immigration.

Reuters/Ipsos has since measured Trump’s approval even lower, at 32%, while Democrats held an eight-point midterm advantage. Republicans are simultaneously spending presidential time and money defending terrain like Nebraska and Florida that ordinarily would not be the center of a favorable Republican midterm map.

So the broad national signal is no longer particularly difficult to find.

Political Weather: National congressional environment — LEAN LEFT
Confidence: High

But then we get to Florida.

And Florida complicates everything.

THE FLORIDA PARADOX

The latest official statewide totals, through August 31, show:

5,649,410 Republicans
4,098,139 Democrats
3,326,661 voters with no party affiliation

That is a Republican registration advantage of roughly 1.55 million voters.

So anyone looking at national polling and declaring Florida suddenly blue is skipping an enormous part of the story.

But something did change in September.

Democrats reportedly added 29,633 active voters, compared with 29,140 Republicans — a tiny Democratic edge, but the first monthly Democratic advantage since this particular tracking began in 2021.

Put those facts together:

Florida’s underlying Republican structure remains extremely strong.

The latest registration flow may be flattening.

And voter sentiment appears capable of moving faster than formal party identification.

That gives us an analytical tool I think is worth keeping.

THE CONVERSION GAP

Political analysis often assumes these things happen together:

Dissatisfaction → Vote change → Party change

They don’t.

A 2024 Trump voter can become unhappy with Trump.

That voter can support a Democrat for Congress.

And that voter can remain a registered Republican throughout the entire process.

Or become an NPA.

Likewise, someone can dislike the Democratic Party and still vote for a Democratic candidate because the alternative is less attractive.

Party registration measures identity. Election results measure behavior.

Behavior can change much faster.

LATINO VOTERS MAY BE THE CLEAREST EXAMPLE

The newest NBC News/Telemundo poll finds Latino voters preferring Democratic control of Congress 59% to 35%.

CBS/YouGov finds Latino likely voters preferring Democratic House candidates 60% to 39%.

Among Latino men — one of Trump’s breakthrough groups in 2024 — recent polling also shows substantial movement back toward Democrats, and roughly one in seven Latino Trump voters from 2024 now says they want Democrats controlling Congress.

But here is what matters:

That does not necessarily mean these voters have become Democrats.

Democratic Party favorability among Latino voters has not recovered nearly as dramatically as Democratic candidate preference has.

That is an important distinction.

Latinos may be moving toward Democratic candidates without moving toward the Democratic Party.

I’ve been calling this Coalition Elasticity.

Rather than treating Hispanic voters as a constituency permanently migrating from one party to another, another possibility is emerging:

These are increasingly movable voters willing to punish whichever party they believe is failing them.

That is a very different political environment.

Especially in Miami.

AFFORDABILITY STILL LOOKS LIKE THE TRANSMISSION BELT

Why are voters moving?

Again and again, the answer comes back to cost.

The latest Latino polling finds nearly two-thirds saying their incomes are failing to keep pace with the cost of living, while 78% disapprove of Trump’s handling of it.

In Miami, “cost of living” isn’t one issue.

It is:

Housing.

Insurance.

Property taxes.

Groceries.

Transportation.

Utilities.

Condo assessments.

The specific bills are different.

The emotional conclusion is remarkably similar:

It costs too much to live here.

That can connect voters who otherwise agree on very little.

And here is where this becomes more interesting than a congressional polling story.

THE SAME VOTER MOOD WILL ALSO BE VOTING ON TAXES, DEBT AND GOVERNMENT

On November 3, voters here won’t only choose candidates.

Florida voters will consider Amendment 3, which would substantially increase the homestead exemption for non-school property taxes, lower the annual assessment-growth cap on non-homestead property from 10% to 5%, and impose additional restrictions on how counties and municipalities use property-tax revenue.

Miami-Dade voters will decide whether to continue the existing one-mill school property-tax levy from July 2027 through June 2031 to support teacher and instructional-personnel compensation and school safety and security.

And City of Miami voters will consider up to $450 million in general-obligation bonds for police and fire facilities, along with a long-term Virginia Key marina redevelopment lease and a charter amendment establishing permanent oversight of G.O.-bond projects.

Now think about those questions through the political mood we just described.

An affordability-anxious voter could:

vote for Amendment 3 because property taxes feel too high;

vote to continue the school levy because teacher pay and school safety feel worth paying for;

vote for public-safety bonds because fire stations and police facilities feel like core government functions;

and still vote against an incumbent because that voter thinks government generally costs too much and performs too poorly.

Or that same voter could reject every tax- or debt-related measure as another demand on the household budget.

Neither combination is ideologically incoherent.

It tells us something more useful.

The November election may test not simply whether voters want “more government” or “less government,” but which government they believe is worth paying for.

That is a much harder question for traditional partisan analysis to answer.

And it is where Political Weather starts becoming Fiscal Weather.

DOES AN AFFORDABILITY ELECTION BECOME AN ANTI-TAX ELECTION?

I don’t think we should assume that.

Voters frequently distinguish between:

tax relief

a service they value

debt they trust

debt they don’t trust

government they believe is competent

and

government they think wastes money.

That means ballot referenda may give us an unusually useful read on voter psychology.

If voters overwhelmingly embrace property-tax relief while also approving specific school or public-safety investments, the message may not be “cut government.”

It may be:

Show me exactly what I’m paying for.

If tax relief passes while local revenue measures struggle broadly, that suggests something different.

And if voters reject Amendment 3 despite intense affordability concerns, that would tell us something important too.

This is why I want to take Amendment 3 apart separately next week.

The first-order question is easy:

Who gets a tax cut?

The more interesting question is the second move:

What happens to local government after the tax base changes?

That deserves its own edition.

IMMIGRATION IS SHOWING THE SAME KIND OF ELASTICITY

The latest Latino polling finds roughly two-thirds saying the administration’s immigration enforcement has gone too far.

That should not automatically be translated into:

“Miami Hispanics have become liberal on immigration.”

A voter can believe simultaneously that:

the border should be secure;

people who commit serious crimes should be deported;

the immigration system is broken;

long-established immigrants deserve legal status;

and current enforcement tactics have gone too far.

Those positions only appear contradictory when politics forces them onto a single left-right line.

That makes Rep. María Elvira Salazar’s decision to publicly criticize the administration’s enforcement approach especially interesting.

Her recent message to Trump explicitly warned that immigration enforcement had gone too far and risked weakening Republicans with Latino voters.

Candidate behavior is often a useful leading indicator.

Politicians usually see movement in their own electorate before the rest of us can measure it perfectly.

THE BIGGER PICTURE

Put all of this together and I keep coming back to the same possibility:

2026 may be a change election without necessarily being an ideological realignment.

Florida can remain structurally Republican.

Miami can remain culturally and politically complicated.

Latino voters can remain skeptical of the Democratic Party.

And Democrats can still substantially outperform their recent baseline.

All of those things can be true at once.

Because:

POLITICAL MOVEMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE POLITICAL CONVERSION.

A voter does not have to become a Democrat to vote against a Republican.

A voter does not have to become progressive to reject Trump.

A voter does not have to become Republican to reject a Democratic incumbent.

And a voter does not need a coherent partisan philosophy to decide that one tax is too high while another public service is worth funding.

That voter is difficult to see through party registration.

But that voter can decide an election.

Miami may have more of them than almost anywhere else.

THE WEATHER MAP

National congressional environment: LEAN LEFT
Confidence: High

Florida statewide partisan baseline: LEAN RIGHT
Confidence: Medium-High

Miami-Dade partisan environment: TOSS-UP / LEAN RIGHT
Confidence: Medium

Hispanic voter movement relative to 2024: LEAN LEFT
Confidence: Medium
This describes movement from the 2024 baseline — not Democratic partisan identification.

City of Miami nonpartisan environment: TOSS-UP / CANDIDATE-DRIVEN
Confidence: Medium

Affordability: DOMINANT / CROSS-PARTISAN
Confidence: High

Local ballot referenda: TRUST + COST TEST
Confidence: Medium
The most useful signal may be whether voters distinguish between broad tax relief and specific public investments.

THE CAUSEWAY READ

The most important story right now may not be that Florida voters are changing parties.

It may be that they don’t need to.

The electorate can move before the voter file does.

And if affordability really has become the organizing political experience it increasingly appears to be, the best evidence may eventually come from someplace other than partisan races.

Watch what voters do when they are asked directly:

Do you want lower property taxes?

Will you continue paying for teacher compensation and school safety?

Will you borrow for police and fire facilities?

Will you authorize a major redevelopment of public waterfront property?

Those answers will tell us considerably more than whether the same voter still has an R, D or NPA beside their name.

WHAT I’M WATCHING NEXT

Today, October 5, is Florida’s voter-registration deadline for the November 3 general election. The state’s October 16 voter extract will include voters registered through today’s book closing.

After that, I’ll be watching:

Vote-by-mail participation by party and geography.

Whether Miami-Dade NPAs participate at elevated rates.

Whether Hispanic turnout matches Hispanic polling.

Whether Republican dissatisfaction becomes crossover voting or abstention.

And whether affordability behaves differently in candidate races than it does on ballot referenda.

Because ultimately the question is not simply:

Who is changing parties?

It is:

Who is changing behavior?

That is the conversion worth watching.

— Ron Bilbao
Founder & Principal, CAUSEWAY

The Bigger Picture looks at the connections between politics, policy, public finance and the forces shaping Miami and South Florida.

Next week: Florida’s Amendment 3 — and why the most important question may not be how much property tax it cuts, but what happens afterward.

Sources & Further Reading

National Political Weather

• New York Times/Siena University Poll of U.S. Voters — Sept. 15, 2026
  Democratic congressional candidates 51%–43% among likely voters; Democrats ahead on health care, immigration and cost of living. Siena Research Institute — NYT/Siena U.S. Voter Poll

• Reuters/Ipsos — Trump approval falls to 32% as cost pressures weigh on voters
  Includes the Reuters/Ipsos midterm congressional preference and presidential-approval findings cited in this edition. Reuters — Sept. 21, 2026 poll

Florida Registration & Party Movement

• Florida Division of Elections — Voter Registration by Party Affiliation
  Official statewide active-voter totals through Aug. 31, 2026. Florida Division of Elections — Party Registration

• Florida Division of Elections — Voter Registration by County and Party
  Official county-level registration data, including Miami-Dade. Florida Division of Elections — County Registration

• Florida Politics — Florida Democrats edge Republicans in September registrations
  Reports 29,633 Democratic registrations versus 29,140 Republican registrations in September. Florida Politics — Oct. 1, 2026

Latino Voters & Immigration

• Axios — Latinos swing back toward Democrats
  Summarizes the latest NBC News/Telemundo and other national Latino polling, including the 59%–35% congressional-control result and movement among Latino men. Axios — Oct. 5, 2026

• The Washington Post — María Elvira Salazar warns Trump immigration enforcement has gone too far
  Background on Salazar’s public break with the administration’s current enforcement approach. The Washington Post — Sept. 17, 2026

Florida & Miami Ballot Questions

• Florida Division of Elections — Amendment 3: Increased Homestead Exemption; Lower Cap on Non-Homestead Assessment Increases
  Official amendment summary and constitutional text. Florida Division of Elections — Amendment 3

• Miami-Dade County — Renewal of School Board One-Mill Referendum
  Official resolution placing continuation of the existing one-mill levy for teacher compensation, instructional personnel, student safety and school security on the Nov. 3 ballot. Miami-Dade County — School Referendum

• City of Miami — 2026 Bond Referendum and Special Election
  Official information on the proposed $450 million police/fire general-obligation bond, bond-oversight charter amendment and other City of Miami ballot questions. City of Miami — Nov. 3, 2026 Special Election

Election Calendar

• Florida Division of Elections — 2026 Election Dates
  Official registration, vote-by-mail, early-voting and Election Day deadlines. Florida Division of Elections — 2026 Election Dates

There is a pretty remarkable public-finance experiment sitting on Florida’s November ballot.

And I don’t think we are talking about it in quite the right way.

Most of the conversation around property taxes understandably focuses on the first-order question:

How much should homeowners pay?

But there is another question that may ultimately matter just as much:

If we collect less money through the property-tax system, what replaces it?

Because the cost of police, parks, transit, roads, schools, fire rescue and local government does not disappear when a tax does.

The bill simply has to arrive somewhere else.

And that is where I think the interesting story begins.

THE IDEA: THE REVERSE ROBIN HOOD RISK

Here is a term I’ve started using to think about what may be happening:

The Reverse Robin Hood Risk.

Not because every property-tax cut is regressive. It isn’t.

And not because every bond, fee or dedicated tax is bad. They aren’t.

The risk emerges from the combination.

Florida could increasingly reduce the broad property-tax base while asking voters to reconstruct pieces of local government one service at a time through:

• Dedicated levies.

• Sales surtaxes.

• User fees.

• General-obligation bonds.

• Earmarked revenues.

In public finance, pieces of this phenomenon are often described as ballot-box budgeting, fiscal fragmentation and earmarking.

I think of it more simply:

We may be moving from the tax roll to the ballot box.

LOOK AT WHAT MIAMI VOTERS WILL SEE IN NOVEMBER

Start with statewide Amendment 3.

If approved, it would increase Florida’s homestead exemption for non-school property taxes to $150,000 in 2027 and $250,000 in 2028, reduce the annual assessment-growth cap on non-homestead property from 10% to 5%, and impose additional constitutional parameters on the use of county and municipal property-tax revenues. Florida Department of State

The official Florida House fiscal analysis estimates the recurring reduction in local non-school property-tax revenue at $11.86 billion by FY 2031-32, assuming current millage rates. Florida House of Representatives

That is not a rounding error.

Now look at what is happening simultaneously here at home.

Miami-Dade voters will be asked to renew the school district’s existing one-mill property-tax levy for another four years to fund teacher and instructional compensation, school safety and security. Importantly, this is an operating levy—not a school construction bond. Miami-Dade County

City of Miami voters will decide whether to authorize up to $450 million in general-obligation bonds for police and fire facilities, repaid through ad valorem taxation within a maximum debt millage of 0.5935 mills. City of Miami

Countywide voters will also consider allowing broader advertising in parks while requiring the resulting revenue to remain exclusively with the park where it is generated. Miami-Dade County

Think about those together.

At one election, voters are being asked to potentially constrain a major general revenue source while separately deciding which specific governmental functions deserve their own protected funding streams.

That juxtaposition is fascinating.

THE BUDGET STARTS TO LOOK DIFFERENT

The traditional model of local government is relatively straightforward:

TAX BASE → GENERAL FUND → ELECTED OFFICIALS SET PRIORITIES

But imagine increasingly moving toward this:

SMALLER GENERAL TAX BASE ↓ SCHOOL LEVY · PUBLIC-SAFETY BOND · TRANSIT FEE · PARK REVENUE · SALES SURTAX · OTHER DEDICATED FUNDS

Each decision may make perfect sense individually.

But collectively?

You can end up with a budget that has plenty of money in it—and surprisingly little money that elected officials can actually move.

I describe it as a budget full of locked rooms.

The money is there.

But every key opens only one door.

WHY THIS COULD BECOME A DISTRIBUTIONAL QUESTION

This is where the “Reverse Robin Hood” analogy becomes relevant.

Property taxes are hardly perfectly progressive. Renters can bear some of their incidence, assessments and exemptions matter, and property ownership does not perfectly correspond with income.

But replacement revenues matter too.

If governments compensate for reduced property-tax capacity with more sales taxes, flat fees, fares and user charges, the burden can migrate toward revenues that consume a larger share of lower-income households’ resources.

So it is possible to deliver very visible tax relief in one place while quietly collecting replacement revenue somewhere else.

Which leads to a deceptively simple distinction:

Property-tax relief is not necessarily the same thing as reducing the cost of government.

Sometimes it reduces government.

Sometimes greater economic growth fills the gap.

Sometimes efficiencies do.

And sometimes we simply change the way the same government gets paid for.

Those are very different outcomes.

THIS ISN’T AN ARGUMENT AGAINST BONDS OR DEDICATED REVENUES

In fact, there are very good reasons to use them.

Long-lived infrastructure is often appropriately financed with long-term debt.

Dedicated revenue can protect important priorities.

Voter approval can increase accountability.

Earmarks can give taxpayers confidence that money will actually be spent where promised.

And Florida homeowners have legitimate reasons to worry about housing affordability and rising carrying costs.

The question I’m interested in is not whether any one of these ideas is good or bad.

It is what happens when you add them all together.

Because ten individually rational fiscal decisions can still create a completely different fiscal architecture.

WATCH THE SECOND MOVE

This is what I’ll be watching if Amendment 3 passes.

Not simply:

How much property-tax revenue goes away?

But:

What happens next?

• Do local governments reduce expenditures?

• Raise millage rates where permitted?

• Increase fees?

• Ask voters for additional dedicated levies?

• Turn more toward sales taxes?

• Issue additional debt?

• Reduce service?

• Find genuine efficiencies?

The first move will get the headlines.

The second move will tell us what the policy actually did.

And that second move may vary dramatically from community to community.

THE CAUSEWAY READ

Here is the way I would describe the fiscal weather today:

Florida is having an explicit conversation about property taxes.

But underneath it, we may be beginning a much bigger conversation about how local government itself is financed.

If the broad tax base becomes narrower while individual services increasingly receive their own bonds, levies, fees and dedicated revenues, we move toward a more fragmented model of government finance.

That model may be more transparent in some ways.

It may also be less flexible.

And depending on what replaces property taxes, the distribution of who pays can change considerably.

That is why the question I think local officials should begin asking is not merely:

“How much are we cutting property taxes?”

It is:

“Are we reducing the cost of government, or merely changing the checkout line?”

That may be one of the more consequential local-government questions Florida faces over the next several years.

And November could give us the first real look at the answer.

— Ron Bilbao
Founder & Principal
CAUSEWAY
Bridging Business. Navigating Government.

Fiscal Weather is CAUSEWAY’s ongoing look at the structural forces changing how South Florida governments raise money, make decisions and deliver services.

I’ve also prepared a short CAUSEWAY white paper examining the issue in greater detail, including the November ballot measures and implications for Miami-Dade local governments.

Sources informing this edition include the Florida Department of State, Florida House of Representatives, Miami-Dade County and City of Miami.

The most important mistake in Miami politics right now may be confusing movement with realignment.

Something is clearly moving.

A new Reuters/Ipsos poll released today puts President Trump’s approval at 32%, while Democrats lead Republicans 43% to 35% when Americans are asked which party’s congressional candidate they would support.

At the same time, Miami-Dade remains structurally very different from the country at large.

As of August 31, Miami-Dade has:

• 458,389 Republicans

• 411,726 Democrats

• 392,300 voters with no party affiliation

Those two realities can exist at the same time.

And that is where I think the interesting story begins.

THE IDEA: COALITION ELASTICITY

For most of the last few years, Miami political analysis has centered on a familiar question:

Is Miami turning red or turning blue?

I increasingly think that may be the wrong question.

The better question is:

How elastic is the coalition that produced Miami-Dade’s dramatic Republican shift in 2020 and 2024?

In other words, which voters genuinely changed their political identity — and which voters simply changed their vote?

That distinction matters enormously.

A Hispanic voter who supported Trump in 2024 because of inflation, dissatisfaction with Democrats or concerns about the direction of the country does not necessarily become a lifelong Republican.

Likewise, disappointment with Trump today does not automatically make that voter a Democrat.

That voter may simply be movable.

And Miami has a lot of movable voters.

Nearly 400,000 registered NPAs alone should make us cautious about treating Miami as a permanently partisan electorate.

WATCH WHAT POLITICIANS DO, NOT JUST WHAT POLLS SAY

One of the most interesting Miami signals this week didn’t come from a poll.

It came from Republican Congresswoman Maria Elvira Salazar.

Salazar publicly criticized aspects of the Trump administration’s immigration enforcement approach, saying it had gone too far.

Whatever one thinks of the policy itself, the political signal is worth noticing.

A Republican incumbent representing a heavily Hispanic Miami district has decided that immigration enforcement is an issue she needs to address directly and publicly.

That tells us something about the local political temperature.

It doesn’t tell us how those voters will ultimately vote.

But it does tell us where pressure is developing.

ANOTHER STRANGE DATA POINT

Florida Democratic primary voters just nominated David Jolly and Gwen Graham with 60.95% of the vote for governor.

Jolly is a former Republican congressman.

Think about that for a moment.

At the same time Democratic voters nationally are expressing extraordinary dissatisfaction with Republicans, Florida Democrats overwhelmingly nominated someone who spent much of his political career as a Republican.

That’s difficult to explain through a simple left-versus-right framework.

It makes considerably more sense through a change-versus-status-quo framework.

And that brings me to the larger hypothesis I’m testing.

2026 MAY BE A CHANGE ELECTION — NOT AN IDEOLOGICAL ONE.

Voters can want something different without wanting something more ideological.

That may be especially true in Miami.

My working hypothesis is that a potentially powerful space is developing between the traditional partisan poles:

Change without ideological conversion.

A voter can be unhappy with Trump without becoming progressive.

A voter can be frustrated with Democrats without embracing every Republican position.

A voter can want stricter public safety policies while simultaneously believing immigration enforcement has gone too far.

A voter can support development but hate traffic.

A voter can care deeply about climate resilience while questioning the tactics of environmental activists.

Real voters are considerably messier than political Twitter.

That’s why the next several weeks are going to be fascinating.

THREE THINGS I’M WATCHING CLOSELY

• Affordability may be the great connector.
  Housing, insurance, groceries, fuel and the general cost of living increasingly cut across partisan identity. If there is one issue capable of moving voters who otherwise disagree politically, this appears to be it.

• The “Activist Gap” is real — and potentially misleading.
  The loudest people at a commission meeting, in a neighborhood WhatsApp group, on Instagram or even in a primary electorate are not necessarily representative of the broader electorate. Intensity tells us something important. It does not automatically tell us where the median voter is.

• Miami’s 2024 coalition should not be assumed permanent — or assumed to be disappearing.
  Republicans still hold a substantial registration advantage in Miami-Dade. At the same time, national conditions have moved considerably since 2024. Both facts belong in the model.

THE NEXT TEST IS BETTER THAN ANOTHER POLL

This week we begin moving from opinion to behavior.

Florida begins sending domestic vote-by-mail ballots for the November election starting September 24.

From there, we can begin watching actual participation.

Not who people say they support.

Who requests ballots.

Who returns them.

Which parts of the electorate are showing up.

Which parts aren’t.

We will still need to be careful: a Republican returning a ballot is not necessarily voting Republican, and the same is true for Democrats.

But participation gives us another instrument.

And as those instruments accumulate — polling, registration, primary results, ballot behavior, demographic movement and ultimately election results — the picture gets sharper.

THE CAUSEWAY READ

Here is how I would describe the political weather today:

The national environment has moved noticeably against Republicans. Miami-Dade, however, remains structurally more Republican than the country as a whole.

The interesting territory is everything in between.

• Hispanic voters.

• NPAs.

• Younger voters.

• Economically dissatisfied voters.

• Low-frequency voters.

• And voters who changed parties — or changed only their vote — during Miami’s political transformation.

That is the electorate I intend to keep watching.

Because the story of Miami in 2026 may not ultimately be that it turned left or stayed right.

It may be that Miami became politically elastic.

And if that’s true, it changes how we should understand almost every local political issue and race that follows.

— Ron Bilbao
Founder & Principal
CAUSEWAY
Bridging Business. Navigating Government.

Political Weather is Causeway’s ongoing analysis of national political trends and what they may — and may not — tell us about Miami.

Sources informing this edition include Reuters/Ipsos, New York Times/Siena, Florida Division of Elections and Miami-Dade election data.